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The relevance of the main instruments of international water law to the hydraulic 
development projects of later-developing upstream states is explored, for a non-legal 
audience. Relevance is gauged by querying common misperceptions, checking the 
compatibility  of the  instruments,  and  considering  their effect along the Nile, Jordan  
and Tigris Rivers and associated aquifers. Specific principles of international water law 
are found to support upstream development in theory, though its relevance is threa- 
tened by incompatibility of clauses between the instruments, the erosion of norm- 
building processes, and a shift away from the idea that territorial sovereignty over a 
fluid resource should be limited.  
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Introduction 
Support for international water law (IWL) is gaining momentum. The last few years has 
witnessed the opening of the UNECE’s Water Convention beyond Europe (in  2011),1 the  
entry into  force  of  the  UN  Watercourses  Convention  (in  2014),  and  a  lively  ongoing 
debate at the UN General Assembly over the Draft Articles on the Law of Transboundary 
Aquifers (Draft Aquifer Articles). These follow the General Assembly’s recognition of the 
Human Right to Water in 2010, and renewed interest in the water aspects of international 
criminal  law  and  international  humanitarian  law.
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The question arises in the non-legal  
water community: Should we care enough about this progress to learn the language and 
issues, and engage in the debates? 
Certainly water resource managers, diplomats  and  researchers  should,  for  tensions 
between upstream and downstream states are increasing, and a compelling case has been   
made  that  IWL  favours  those  downstream  nations  that  have  already   developed  the  
transboundary resource (Wegerich & Olsson, 2010). This article queries that argument  
by investigating the extent to which IWL is relevant to the later-developing, upstream 
states. It follows a tradition of articles on water law in Water International (e.g. Leb, 
2015; Vink, 2014; Wouters & Chen, 2015), though in considering also the politics of 
water  interaction  between  states,  it  is  written  for  a  non-legal  water    audience.  The  
relevance is gauged by reviewing common misperceptions about law and lesser-known 
clauses, then by cross-checking the mutual compatibility of the many legal instruments 
that make up the body of IWL, and finally by querying the effect of IWL on the behaviour 
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of riparian states along the Jordan, Nile, and Tigris Rivers and associated aquifers. This is 
preceded by a critical review of the relevant legal principles and debates, and followed by  
discussion of the implications of the  findings. 
The analysis finds that on the whole, IWL is entirely relevant to all late-developing 
upstream states. Taken  (momentarily) out of the political context, the chief legal instru-    
ments are found to contain no provisions  which  compromise upstream  development  or 
privilege downstream development. This theoretical relevance of IWL is found to be  
threatened, however, through a perceptible shift away from coordinated to unilateral 
transboundary activity, through erosion of the norm-building feature of international  law 
(as when IWL is ignored or discredited by those seeking to maintain the status quo) and 
through incompatible clauses (in particular the sovereignty  clause  in  the  Draft  Aquifer 
Articles). IWL’s actual influence over the transboundary water arrangements in  the cases  
considered is found to be  qualified,  revealing  how  the  threats  may  and  do  play  out  in 
practice. The article argues that the advances  IWL  has  made  in  tackling  the  collective 
challenge of governing a fluid transboundary resource across static territorial borders may 
be reversed, suggesting that work to harmonize the interests gains even greater importance, 
and that the non-legal water community should have greater influence over the phenomena.  
 
 
Background: the development and politics of  IWL 
Past and future challenges of IWL: reconciling watercourse boundaries and political borders 
The mid-to-late twentieth century, during which IWL blossomed,  was  an  era  largely 
dominated by early-developing  downstream  nations,  reflecting  thousands  of  years  of 
human settlement along the flat and fertile lower reaches of rivers.    Successive Egyptian  
governments developed the Nile’s irrigation and hydroelectric potential through the dams 
in Aswan in the early 1900s and 1960s, for example, several decades ahead of the recent 
upstream Ethiopian efforts. Likewise, downstream Iraqi development of  the  Tigris  and 
Euphrates throughout the 1950s and 1970s preceded the ongoing irrigation and (relatively 
much larger) hydropower dams developed by Turkey from the 1990s onwards. And Israel’s  
draining of the Huleh marshes, damming of the Lake of Tiberias, and extensive ground-    
water development from the 1950s to the 1970s was completed at least 50 years ahead of 
the dams and deep wells that the governments of Lebanon and Palestine still seek to build 
on a tributary of the Jordan River and transboundary aquifers. The ‘hydraulic missions’ of 
these downstream governments enabled a degree of control over their societies, and in  
many cases helped the states flourish economically (see e.g. Allan, 2001; Molle, Mollinga, 
& Wester, 2009; Swyngedouw, 1999). But the states also became dependent on the use of 
the established flows, and so, vulnerable – indefinitely – to any upstream water develop- 
ment projects. 
Currently, the upstream states are proceeding headlong in their own hydraulic mis-  
sions, and, unlike the downstreamers, maintain sovereignty over the territory where the 
transboundary flows originate. Dams on the  drawing  board  or  under  construction  in 
Ethiopia, Lebanon, Turkey and Iran generate concern regarding their downstream impact 
that downstreamers were never obliged to contemplate – and set up what Wouters (2014, 
p. 67) refers to as the “upstream dilemma”. The response is often one of   effective sabre-  
rattling. Through a number of tactics and strategies, downstream Egypt, Israel and Iraq 
have managed to thwart the intended upstream development – at least for as long as 
asymmetries in power have favoured them (Salman, 2013; Zawahri, 2008; Zeitoun et al., 
forthcoming). 
3 
 
 
Transboundary water management, diplomacy and law thus have their work cut out. 
IWL in particular is intended “to determine a State’s entitlement to the benefits of the 
watercourse . . . and to establish certain requirements for States’ behaviour while devel- 
oping the resource” (Wouters, Vinogradov, Allan, Jones, & Rieu-Clarke, 2005, p. 15). In 
other words, IWL is meant to establish a state’s rights and obligations vis-à-vis other 
states with respect to transboundary water. Unlike national law, there can be no direct 
enforcement of IWL, but it can build norms about ‘acceptable’ state behaviour and guide 
bilateral or multilateral treaties (to which IWL is always  subordinate). 
IWL is thus at the heart of a broader and very current debate about how sovereign 
political entities may jointly govern, or at least coordinate, the development of common 
resources in a sustainable manner (see e.g. Eckersley, 2004; Litfin, 1997). The international 
borders that water flows across, underneath, or above (in rivers, aquifers, or clouds) set up 
particular “hydropolitical constellations” (Hensengerth, Dombrowski, & Scheumann, 2012) 
that water managers, analysts and diplomats should consider. In legal terms, the dissonance 
pits the new doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty against the old doctrine of absolute 
territorial  sovereignty. 
 
 
From absolute to limited territorial sovereignty, and from no harm to equitable and 
reasonable use – and back  again? 
Insofar as it is possible to do so in lay terms, this section recounts the evolution of IWL 
through its many different bodies and instruments.
3 
The interstate conflicts created by 
boundary–border dissonance and the uncoordinated development of rivers has been 
addressed by the international water legal community through the development of at   
least four doctrines and dozens of principles of interstate water sharing. The development 
of a selection of these is tracked in Figure 1, and discussed in the following.
4,5
 
The doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty asserts that a “state is free to dispose, 
within its territory, of the waters of an international river in any manner it deems fit” 
(Salman, 2007, p. 627). At a superficial level, this doctrine (also known as the Harmon 
Doctrine) seems clearly in the interests of upstream states, and has been largely discre- 
dited as a principle due to the serious impact it can allow upon downstream states (in the 
most extreme cases, all flows may be diverted or retained). In contrast, the doctrine of 
limited territorial sovereignty asserts that “every riparian State has a right to use the waters 
of the international river, but is under a corresponding duty to ensure that such use does 
not harm other riparians” (Salman, 2007, p. 627). In many senses, the doctrine of limited 
territorial sovereignty (also known as shared sovereignty – see McIntyre, 2007; Stephens, 
2012) tackles basin–border dissonance by trying to rise above the restrictive notion of 
sovereignty, while absolute territorial sovereignty seeks to re-establish a centuries-old 
order. Both doctrines appear to be influential, currently. 
Concern about downstream impact drove the development of the original principle   
of IWL in 1911: ‘no harm’. Very much in the spirit of absolute territorial sovereignty,   
the principle of no harm means that the development of a resource by one state must     
not harm another state. The International Law Association (hereafter, the Association) 
may have been the first to challenge the doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty, 
through its 1956 Dubrovnik Statement and 1958 New York Resolution. The basic right  
of states to a “reasonable and equitable share” of water was declared there for the first 
time internationally, and was later developed in the Helsinki Rules. The UN Economic 
Commission for Europe (UNECE) drew on the ILA’s Helsinki Rules and the  
International  Law  Commission’s  (the  Commission’s)  ongoing  work,  which  calls for 
4 
 
 
 
 
                                                      
 
 
      
 
 
 
      
 
Compatible with 
UNWC 
    
 
     
 
      
 
     
 
      
 
    
 
 
       
 
Articles 1997 UN 
Watercourses 
Convention 
Equitable 
and 
reasonable 
use + seven factors 
 
 
 
Sovereignty over 
aquifers 
 
Limited 
sovereignty 
 
 
Reasonable 
and 
equitable 
share 
 
 
Reasonable 
and 
equitable 
Use + eleven 
factors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unconnected 
aquifers 
 
 
No harm 
 
Reasonable 
and 
equitable 
 
No harm 
 
Right of use 
over 
No harm 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Developments in international water law, at times coevolving, at others evolving 
independently. The principles (in italics) are developed by different international bodies and form 
part of various instruments. The shifts in guiding doctrines are shown across the top of the figure. 
Based on Dellapenna (2003); McCaffrey (2007); Rieu-Clarke, Moynihan, & Magsig (2012); 
Salman, (2007). 
 
 
states parties “to ensure that transboundary waters are used in an equitable and  
reasonable way”. 
The Commission meanwhile completed its codification of state practice in 1994, 
leading to the adoption in 1997 of the UN Watercourses Convention (UNWC), which 
details obligations of “no significant harm”, “prior notification”, and “equitable and 
reasonable use”. Drawing heavily on the Association’s Helsinki Rules, the UNWC also 
details seven illustrative factors from which equitable and reasonable use may be derived 
(as discussed later). It entered into force with its 35th state ratification, in August 2014. 
On the back of the development of the UNWC, the Association developed the Helsinki 
Rules into the 1999 Campione Consolidation and the 2004 Berlin Rules. The UNECE 
Water Convention entered into force in 1996 (UNECE, 1992, 2011),
6 
and was opened to 
ratification beyond Europe in 2012 (Tanzi, 2013). With the support of the UNESCO 
International Hydrological Programme, the Commission tabled the Draft Aquifer Articles 
in 2008. The Draft Aquifer Articles had initially set out to fill a perceived gap of the UNWC 
in relation to fossil water, but they have evolved to emphasize aquifers rather than ground- 
water itself, and are currently being discussed at the UN General Assembly.
7
 
A debate reflecting the philosophical grounding of the main doctrines has developed 
from these many different instruments and processes, notably the primacy of equitable and 
reasonable use versus no significant harm (see e.g. Brooks, 2011; Dellapenna, 2001; 
McCaffrey, 2008; McIntyre, 2007; Wegerich & Olsson, 2010). The case for the supremacy 
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of equitable and reasonable use is based on the detail of its seven illustrative factors – which 
includes the possible harm (as well as benefits) of the intended use, as discussed later. The 
approach is pragmatic, in the sense that it accepts that all states, including late-developing 
upstream states, will in one way or another ‘develop’ their resources, and that some harm is 
inevitable (McCaffrey, 2007, chs. 10, 11) – consistent with the doctrine of limited territorial 
sovereignty, in other words, and a rejection of absolute territorial sovereignty. 
With the development of the 2004 Berlin Rules and the 2008 Draft Aquifer Articles, 
the debate has been given a new twist. The Draft Aquifer Articles’ most contentious 
passage is in Article 3, which states that “Each aquifer State has sovereignty over the 
portion of the transboundary aquifer or aquifer system located within its territory. It shall 
exercise its sovereignty in accordance with international law and the present draft articles” 
(emphasis added). The introduction of a role for state sovereignty suggests a return to the 
guiding doctrine of absolute territorial sovereignty and, indirectly, the supremacy of the no 
harm principle. Arguments in support of such an introduction are centred around the fact 
that the draft articles relate to the structure of the aquifer, not directly to the groundwater 
running through it (Del Castillo-Laborde, 2011; Eckstein, 2011), or improved political 
acceptability to UN member states (Eckstein & Sindico, 2014). Arguments against the 
clause align with general concern about the re-assertion of state interests and positions, 
rather than common ones (McCaffrey, 2014; McIntyre, 2011). The debate is entered 
further into here only to the extent that it is relevant to the purposes of this article; that   
is, by noting that this introduction opens the door of law-making processes a little wider to 
the vagaries of realist international politics. 
 
 
Law: subject of politics, or norm   building? 
If we accept that the politics and legal wrangling over transboundary waters are shaped by 
– and not determining of – the broader political context within which they play out   (see 
e.g. Brunnée & Toope, 2002; Rieu-Clarke, 2010), it follows that the relevance of IWL 
must be considered within the enabling or constraining effects of the international political 
setting within which it operates. There is no reason to believe that IWL should be spared 
the shortcomings that general international law is exposed to. These have been identified 
as the lack of central enforcement; the decentralized structure that favours strong over 
weak states; and the numerous violations which occur with impunity (see e.g. Hathaway, 
2005; Koh, 1997). 
IWL is downplayed or ignored on similar grounds, or for being subordinate to 
international treaties, for instance, in much water conflict resolution or hydro-diplomacy 
research (e.g. Delli-Priscoli & Wolf, 2008; Trondalen, 2008; Cronin & Hamlin, 2010; 
Stimson, 2010; DNI, 2012; and see discussion in Magsig,  2015). 
The UNWC itself has been criticized for being too vague (Beaumont, 2005) or 
misleading (Lankford, 2013), and Moussa (2013) argues that application of the UNWC  
in the case of the Nile ended up “institutionalising conflict”. The convention has also been 
blamed for replicating in new areas the neoliberal economic and political foundations 
upon which it was created (D’Souza, 2010). The line of argument is that law may be 
considered simply a tool to promote the interests of powerful states, for instance by 
facilitating treaties that are skewed in their favour (Zeitoun & Warner,  2006). 
As Wegerich and Olsson (2010) point out, the reasoning is consistent with a realist 
and critical-realist view of the political order of the world. Certainly, asymmetric use and 
control of flows abound (Dinar, Katz, De Stefano, & Blankspoor, 2012; Gleditsch, 
Furlong, Hegre, Lacina, & Owen, 2006), and in most hegemonic contexts very much 
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reflects the balance of power between the riparian states (Fox & Sneddon, 2007; Olmstead 
& Sigman, 2014; Zeitoun, Mirumachi, & Warner,  2011). 
Theory seeking to explain when and why states do comply with international law 
argues that it serves national interests, either through its use as a rhetorical device or in the 
promotion of international norms (see e.g. Goldsmith & Posner, 2005, § 3). IWL itself has 
been noted to influence the development of norms through “interest-shaping” (Koh, 1997, 
p. 2562) and norm-building processes (Brunnée & Toope, 2002; see also Hathaway, 2005; 
Rieu-Clarke, 2010; Cullet, 2011; McCaffrey, 2013; Acharya, in Çonker, 2014). The use of 
IWL as a rhetorical device has also been noted as a way to increase bargaining power 
(Daoudy, 2008) and is definitely of relevance to the cases considered in what   follows. 
 
 
Testing the relevance of IWL to upstream   states 
While the political wrangling and legal debates rage, the concrete continues to pour into 
some large upstream water infrastructure projects. This section tests the relevance of IWL 
to such projects of upstream states, first by reviewing less well-known principles, thereby 
checking for gaps in IWL’s theoretical coverage; then by cross-checking the mutual 
compatibility of the legal instruments, to verify coherence; and finally by querying its 
effect on the behaviour of riparian states along the Jordan, Nile, and Tigris Rivers and 
associated aquifers, to test the match of theory and  reality. 
 
 
Rethinking perceptions of how principles and arguments support upstream or 
downstream  states:  foreclosure  of future  uses, countermeasures and reciprocity 
Many in the non-legal water community may hold perceptions about which principles of 
law favour up- or downstreamers. It is expected, for example, that developed downstream 
states (say, Egypt) will promote the principle of no harm in order to protect against 
upstream hydraulic development. Upstream states (e.g. Ethiopia) would be expected to 
push for equitable and reasonable use, as it provides some scope for use of the water at a 
later stage in their development trajectory (see e.g. McIntyre,  2015). 
But IWL is much more nuanced. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the no harm obligation 
may actually support the development plans of upstream states, especially if the down- 
stream state has extensively developed the watercourse in question. As McCaffrey (2007) 
and Salman (2010) point out, there is increasing recognition (reflected in practice
8
) that 
upstream use of the flows can be foreclosed when downstream development of a water- 
course is so extensive that any action by the upstream state will cause downstream harm, 
or give rise to downstream claims of inequitable use. India’s concerns with (then-down- 
stream) Pakistani development on the Ganges, and Ethiopia’s official reply to Egyptian 
development of the Toshka on the Nile, both reveal upstreamers’ awareness that down- 
stream development does not or should not compromise the right of the former to develop 
(Salman, 2010). Known as foreclosure of future uses, the logic ensures that development 
by downstream states is not favoured, at least on paper – and also leads to a related debate 
about whether existing or potential uses have priority (Wouters et al.,  2005). 
The legal measures of countermeasures and reciprocity may also challenge our assump- 
tions. Countermeasures are “measures, which would otherwise be contrary to the interna- 
tional obligations of an injured State vis-à-vis the responsible State” (UN, 2012, p. 304) – 
legitimate breaches of law, to use non-legal terms. The principle of countermeasures could 
thus be used to assert that a violation of an obligation under IWL by one state could lead to 
a legitimate proportional breach of a corresponding obligation by another state, so long as 
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the initial violation consists of a ‘serious or material’ breach. As will be discussed, this 
means that upstream Ethiopia or Lebanon could be within its legal rights to proportionally 
breach the no harm obligation, if downstream Egypt or Israel had breached the obligation 
ensuring equitable and reasonable use in a ‘serious and material’ way. Proportionality is all 
but guaranteed, furthermore, where a countermeasure is taken by way of reciprocity. As 
noted in AFIAL (2014), this approach has been recognized by the International Court of 
Justice in the context of transboundary waters in the case of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros 
Project (Hungary v.  Slovakia).
9
 
 
 
Compatibility check of legal   instruments 
From a norm-building perspective, the more that the legal principles and main instruments 
are aligned, the more robust is the body of law itself. The opposite holds true as well; 
incompatibility between the principles and instruments may ultimately weaken the body of 
law, because the great number of interpretations they allow can eventually discredit its 
reputation as an objective tool. The relevance of IWL to any state (whether up- or down- 
stream, and early- or late-developing) is thus tied to the degree of harmony amongst the 
instruments. Table 1 assesses the compatibility of the more relevant principles found in 
some or all of the three main legal instruments, and these are discussed in what follows.
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Equitable and reasonable utilization, and factors relevant to its  determination 
The principle of equitable and reasonable use of transboundary waters is mentioned 
explicitly in the UNWC (Art. 5), the Draft Aquifer Articles (Art. 4), and the UNECE 
 
 
Table 1. Mutual Compatibility check of the main principles of selected international water legal 
instruments. 
 
 
 
 
Obligations 
 
UN 
Watercourses 
Convention 
(UNWC) 
 
 
UNECE 
Water 
Convention 
 
 
 
Draft Aquifer 
Articles 
 
 
General remarks/ 
observations/ 
implications Compatible? 
 
Equitable and 
reasonable 
utilization 
(ERU) 
Factors relevant 
to ERU 
Art. 5; also Art. 
24, pars A 
and B 
 
Art. 6 (cf. Art. 
24, par. 2-b, 
and Art. 8) 
Art. 2-c Art. 4 The UNWC also adds 
“optimal and 
sustainable 
utilisation” 
n/m Art.5 Art. 24, par. 2-b, of 
UNWC adds 
“rational 
utilisation”; Art. 8 
adds “spirit of 
cooperation” 
Yes 
 
 
 
Yes 
Prevention of 
significant 
harm 
Art. 7; Art. 32 n/m Art. 6 n/m Yes 
Prior notification    Art. 12 n/m Art. 15.2 n/m Yes 
Sovereignty n/m n/m Art. 3, Sovereignty 
of aquifer states 
(territorialism) 
See discussion No 
throughout text 
 
 
Note: ‘n/m’ indicates that the concerned obligation/principle/rule is not mentioned in the specific legal instru- 
ment; ‘Yes’ indicates that the specified obligation/rule/principle is not incompatible between the international 
legal instruments; ‘No’ indicates incompatibility between some or all of the instruments. 
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Water Convention (Art. 2-c). The UNWC (Art. 6 and Art. 24, par. 2-b) and the Draft 
Aquifer Articles (Art. 5) elaborate upon the factors relevant to its definition, with the most 
relevant differences discussed in what follows. Though these differences are not signifi- 
cant enough to represent incompatibility between the two legal instruments, they may well 
lead to support of considerably different positions in political processes, though in ways 
that are not discussed further here. Relevant factors include the  following. 
 
(1) Particular biophysical aspects of the body of water under consideration. As 
would be expected, the Draft Aquifer Articles refer much more clearly to aquifers 
and groundwater, specifying the quantification of “the contribution to the forma- 
tion and recharge of the aquifer or aquifer system” (Article 5.1d). They also 
distinguish between the geological particularities or aquifers (i.e. their formation 
and recharge dynamics), though this latter point is comparable to the UNWC’s 
“factors of a natural character”. 
(2) Use versus effect. The Draft Aquifer Articles are marked, too, by explicitly stating 
that both the “actual and potential effects” of the utilization of the aquifer or 
aquifer system are to be taken into consideration, whereas the UNWC limits its 
enumeration to “existing and potential uses”. The wording of the Draft Aquifer 
Articles here might favour downstream states that have already developed their 
resources, for the stress is placed upon impact rather than  use. 
(3) Vital human needs. While “vital human needs” is mentioned explicitly in the 
UNECE Water Convention and the UNWC, the Draft Aquifer Articles go further 
in suggesting that “special regard” be given to them when determining equitable 
and reasonable use (Art. 5.2). This addition would seem to favour riparian states 
with communities that are more dependent on the resource (i.e. early-developing 
downstream states). 
(4) Factors versus circumstances. The UNWC states that “all relevant factors and 
circumstances” must be taken into account when determining equitable and 
reasonable use; the Draft Aquifer Articles shorten this to “all relevant factors”. 
This omission is not explained, and while suggesting reduction of space for the 
consideration of particular circumstances, it may be nothing more than a simpli- 
fication of definition. 
(5) Economy of use. Whereas the UNWC suggests consideration of “conservation, 
protection, development and economy of use”, the Draft Aquifer Articles do not 
include the latter term. This could allow space in the UNWC for an argument 
favouring the riparian state that is more economically ‘efficient’ with their use of 
water – in terms of ‘crops per drop’ or ‘dollars per drop’ (Allan, 2001), for example. 
(6) Comparable value of alternatives. The UNWC is the sole instrument which 
specifies that evaluation of available alternatives shall be  “of  comparable  
value”. This means that a state  should not be forced to use an alternative  in  
order to avoid disadvantaging another state when that alternative is of signifi- 
cantly less value – and may be seen to be to the advantage of (wet) late- 
developing upstream states. 
(7) Spirit of cooperation. The UNWC is also the only instrument which obliges states 
to “enter into consultations in a spirit of cooperation”. Omission of this language 
from the Draft Aquifer Articles is not explained, but it can be hypothesized that 
the Commission considered it redundant in light of the “general obligation to 
cooperate” (Draft Art. 7). 
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Prevention of significant harm 
The obligation not to cause significant harm is stated explicitly in Articles 7 (and 32) of 
the UNWC and in Article 6 of the Draft Aquifer Articles. No incompatibility is generated 
by the omission of this obligation from the UNECE Water Convention, given the latter’s 
overall tenor and raison  d’être.11 
 
 
Prior notification 
According to the UNWC (Art. 12) and Draft Aquifer Articles (Art. 15.2), states intending 
any measures on a transboundary watercourse have an obligation to provide notification 
of a specified period to other states that may suffer from “the implementation of planned 
measures which may have a significant adverse effect upon other watercourse States” (to 
use the UNWC’s wording). No such obligation exists in the UNECE Water Convention. 
The principle of foreclosure of future uses suggests a flip side to the obligation, however. 
If downstream development of a watercourse is so extensive that any action by the 
upstream state will cause downstream harm, or give rise to downstream claims of 
inequitability, it follows that the downstream state should also notify its upstream co- 
riparian of contemplated projects affecting the watercourse. 
 
 
Sovereignty 
Considering the earlier discussion of how the introduction of ‘sovereignty’ into the body 
of IWL may indicate a shift away from the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty 
towards that of absolute territorial sovereignty, it is not surprising to find it as the main 
incompatible element between the instruments considered here. Quite apart from the 
previously discussed advantages and disadvantages of the role of ‘sovereignty’, the 
incompatibility introduced between the two instruments weakens the body of law as a 
whole, in the normative sense. Should the Draft Aquifer Articles become an international 
convention, it is possible that states that do not ratify (or that do not openly support) the 
UNWC may end up supporting an aquifer convention, or vice versa. Such incompatibility 
may make IWL a tool for competition between different instruments, rather than for 
practical cooperation. 
 
 
IWL at use for upstream states on the Jordan, Nile and Tigris Rivers 
This section queries the potential and actual effect of IWL in support of the hydraulic 
development plans of the upstream riparians along the Eastern Nile, Jordan and Tigris 
Rivers. The cases are summarized in Table 2, and discussed in the   following. 
 
 
Eastern Nile River 
Ethiopia’s decision in 2010 to push ahead with the signature (and probably eventual 
ratification) of the NBI-initiated Cooperative Framework Agreement has been interpreted 
as a reflection of the change of power away from Egypt (Cascão, 2014; Nicol & Cascão, 
2011). Certainly it was a direct challenge to the 1959 Nile Agreement between (only) 
Egypt and Sudan. The Cooperative Framework Agreement very closely emulated the 
UNWC, listing almost identical procedural and substantive obligations. It could thus be 
read as general Egyptian and full Ethiopian support for the principles of the UNWC.
12
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Table 2. Summary of relevant clauses and use of international water law (IWL) by upstream states 
along the Jordan, Nile, and Tigris and Euphrates  Rivers. 
 
 
 
Upstream 
state 
 
National unilateral 
hydraulic 
development 
interests Actual use of IWL 
 
IWL principles 
invoked in support 
of national interests 
(ERU, NSH, PN) 
 
Possible basis of 
argument in support 
of unilateral national 
interests 
 
 
Eastern Nile (downstream Egypt, hegemon) 
Ethiopia Construction of the 
Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam 
(started in 2011) 
Sudan Irrigation, at least to 
its 18.5 km3/y 
share 
Considerable – IWL served to 
guide the CFA, which 
Ethiopia has supported 
 
Considerable – IWL served to 
guide the CFA, which Sudan 
eventually rejected 
ERU, NSH, PN Countermeasures, 
foreclosure of 
future use 
 
ERU, NSH, PN Countermeasures, 
foreclosure of 
future use 
Jordan River and TB aquifers (downstream Israel, hegemon) 
Lebanon Plans to develop the 
Ebl el Saqi dam 
(and to develop 
groundwater) 
Palestine Exploitation of 
Western Aquifer 
Basin 
Medium – invoked during 2002 
Wazzani dispute 
 
 
Considerable – IWL forms 
basis of negotiating position 
ERU only Countermeasures, 
foreclosure of 
future use 
 
ERU, NSH, PN Countermeasures, 
foreclosure of 
future use 
Tigris (upstream Turkey, hegemon) 
Turkey GAP project From opposition to minor use: 
rejection of UNWC in 1997; 
some use of ERU during 
1980s negotiations with 
Syria 
 
NSH, PN only Foreclosure of 
future use 
Iran Multiple projects on 
the Tigris 
tributaries 
None apparent NSH, PN only Foreclosure of 
future use 
 
Note. ERU = equitable and reasonable utilization; NSH = no significant harm; PN = prior notification; CFA = 
cooperative framework agreement; GAP indicates Southeastern Anatolia Project. 
 
 
The government of Ethiopia’s initiation of construction of the Grand Ethiopian 
Renaissance Dam in 2011 occurred outside of the Nile Basin Initiative (NBI) process, 
and contains no indication of being guided by IWL (IPoE, 2013); yet the Declaration of 
Principles (signed March 2015) has certainly taken on board the obligations of significant 
harm and equitable and reasonable use (if in different  terms). 
Countermeasures could be invoked by Ethiopia to breach the no significant harm 
principle following decades of Egyptian thwarting of upstream development (Brunnée 
& Toope, 2002; Phillips & Woodhouse, 2009; Waterbury, 2002), though this may not 
be politically expedient under current circumstances. Midstream between Ethiopia and 
Egypt, Sudanese support for IWL is more ambiguous (Eissa, 2008). The Sudanese 
government’s refusal to sign the Cooperative Framework Agreement may have been 
based more on concern over re-allocation of Nile flows (see  Mekonnen,  2010;  
Salman, 2013) than on direct opposition to IWL. Its participation in the 1959 Egypt–
Sudan treaty still assures the state the right to “develop” an  additional 1–5  km3/y 
(Mohieldeen, 2008), much of which is likely to be made possible following the 
Ethiopian construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam further upstream. In 
this sense, the UNWC and the UNECE Water Convention (and IWL more generally) 
appear to support the  development interests of both  upstream   countries. 
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Jordan River and transboundary aquifers 
The obstacles to hydraulic development by Lebanon and Palestine – upstream of Israel on 
the Jordan River and transboundary aquifers, respectively – have been well documented 
(Amery, 2002; Selby, 2013; World Bank, 2009; Zeitoun, Eid-Sabbagh, Dajani, & Talhami, 
2012).
13 
Lebanon’s ratification of the UNWC may have originally been swayed by Syrian 
influence over the country (AFIAL, 2014), but the principle of equitable and reasonable 
use was invoked clearly by the Lebanese government during the 2002 Wazzani Springs 
dispute (GOL, 2002), concerns expressed by Israel about its selective use of IWL (i.e. no 
mention of no significant harm) notwithstanding (Zeitoun, Talhami, & Eid-Sabbagh, 
2013). The UNWC – and in particular the principle of equitable and reasonable use –  
has also served as the foundation for the Palestinian proposal for resolution of the 
Palestinian–Israeli water conflict, in its formal negotiations with Israel (Phillips, Attili, 
McCaffrey, & Murray, 2005; PWA, 2012; RPSO, 2009). 
Given the asymmetry in control by the downstream hegemon in both cases, counter- 
measures could be argued as the basis for a breach by either Lebanon or Palestine of    
any of its obligations, in light of significant downstream development (foreclosure). In 
the current balance of power, however, such an argument would not be expected to be 
developed, any more than the Lebanese plans for the Ebl el Saqi Dam on the Hasbani 
River (RoL, 2008) or Palestinian aspirations for deep wells in the Western  Aquifer   
Basin (Koek, 2013; MacDonald et al., 2009). Lebanon has also commented on the Draft 
Aquifer Articles – regarding clarification of the terms ‘aquifer’ and ‘aquifer state’ 
(UNGA, 2012, comment 39) – but has  not  commented  on  the  introduction  of  the 
term ‘sovereignty’. In contrast, the official comment by Israel at the Draft Aquifer 
Articles’ first reading (in the Commission’s 60th Session, May/June 2008) clearly 
supports the introduction of the concept of sovereignty to the draft legal articles (see   
also  Eckstein &  Sindico, 2014).
14
 
 
 
Tigris River 
It is along the Tigris River that the distinction between riparian position, power and law 
becomes most clear. In contrast to the other cases, no downstream hegemon has (recently) 
impeded the hydraulic development of upstream riparians on the Tigris, to say the least. 
Both Turkey and Iran are wholly engaged in ‘hydraulic missions’, the negative impacts of 
which are felt first and foremost in downstream Iraq (see e.g. Chavoshian, Takeuchi, & 
Funada, 2005; Masih, 2011; UN-ESCWA/BGR, 2013, chs 3, 5; Zawahri & Gerlak, 
2009).
15  
Neither state is turning to IWL to support its activities in the basin, and there  
are no treaties that claim to shape water sharing within it. For instance, the 2009 Turkish 
policy clearly prioritizes “sovereign right” over the principles of “no significant harm” and 
“equitable, reasonable, and optimum” use (Kramer & Kibaroglu, 2011, p. 217). Turkish 
opposition to the UNWC has been consistent in public and closed-door meetings. The 
Turkish government was one of only three to vote against the UWNC in 1997, has argued 
against it at the UN General Assembly on the grounds that it does not recognize a state’s 
sovereign rights (UNGA, 1997), and has, moreover, suggested deletion of the no sig- 
nificant harm rule (Kibaroglu, 2015). There is nuance, of course – the fact that ‘no harm’ 
and ‘equitable and reasonable use’ are mentioned at all in the national policy suggests 
Turkish use of IWL, at least as a rhetorical device to improve its bargaining position 
(Daoudy, 2007). Turkey also supported the introduction of ‘sovereignty’ to the Draft 
Aquifer Articles at its first  reading.
16
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The government of Iran originally supported the UNWC, but has not followed with 
ratification, nor commented on the Draft Aquifer Articles. Currently facing significant 
internally created water crises (Gohari et al., 2013; Madani, 2014), the government of  
Iran is not expected to risk delaying development efforts by opening negotiations on 
downstream impacts (Al-Faraj & Scholz, 2015, Nageeby, 2014) – despite its own down- 
tream position in relation to Afghanistan (Thomas and Warner, 2015). Although Iraq has 
acceded to the UNWC, previous governments have not promoted any allocation of flows 
based on equitable and reasonable use (Çonker, 2014; Trondalen, 2008). The government of 
Iraq thus finds itself in the hydropolitical position that the government of Egypt may well 
find itself in: as a downstream early developer that did not employ IWL as a guide to fair 
water sharing when it had the opportunity to do so, and so is vulnerable to upstream 
development. 
As with the other cases, there is nothing in the letter or interpretation of IWL that 
obstructs Iran or Turkey from completing their upstream development plans. Both states 
could highlight the extensive Iraqi development during the 1950s–1990s, invoking fore- 
closure of future uses as the basis of their argument. This would have to be tempered with 
the primacy of the principle of equitable and reasonable use, however, suggesting greater 
consideration to downstream impacts be given. 
 
 
Concluding discussion: the relevance of IWL to late-developing upstream   states 
The analysis of legal theory and cases has made a number of points of note to this article’s 
goal of investigating the extent to which IWL is relevant to later-developing upstream 
states. Contrary to the perceptions of perhaps many in the non-legal water community, 
there are no terms in any of the instruments of IWL that might be interpreted to inhibit 
their hydraulic development plans. The UNECE Water Convention, UN Watercourses 
Convention, and Draft Aquifer Articles are each evaluated as a coherent instrument to 
determine an upstream state’s entitlement to use watercourses within its legal obligations 
to other states (to return to the role claimed by IWL). Research arguing that IWL is biased 
towards first-developing downstream states (e.g. Wegerich & Olsson, 2010) may result 
from a tendency to downplay the role that foreclosure, reciprocity, and countermeasures 
can play in developing a case in support of upstream hydraulic development (see also 
Brooks, 2011). But the argument also reflects an awareness of the politics of law that 
ensures a sharp distinction between the letter and spirit of IWL, and its application. It is 
from within this gap between theory and reality that the limits of IWL – for any state – are 
revealed. 
Indeed, the analysis has shown that IWL’s ability to influence actual transboundary 
water arrangements must be qualified. IWL continues to guide the behaviour of states on 
the Eastern Nile through the 2010 Cooperative Framework Agreement and the 2015 
Declaration of Principles. While this is seen as an outcome of the recent shifts in power 
asymmetry between the states, IWL is nonetheless serving a somewhat coordinated effort 
to share the common resource. Along the Jordan, despite guiding the positions of the 
weaker upstream states, the lack of change in water sharing over several decades is more 
accurately attributed to the pursuit of unilateral state interests, buttressed by power 
asymmetry. IWL has been used instrumentally by the more powerful states along the 
Tigris, leaving downstream Iraq at the mercy of upstream states that either ignore IWL or 
officially prioritize sovereign rights over collective ones. 
Furthermore, the ability of IWL to influence state behaviour is found to be threatened, 
both in theory and practice, because of the inherent tensions created by sovereign political 
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entities seeking to govern a resource that spans their borders. One threat to the relevance 
of IWL stems from its discrediting. Though the UNWC has entered into force, a majority 
of states – basin hegemons, typically – do not support the it, and some actively oppose it 
(Adelphi, 2014; DFID, 2008; WWF-DFID, 2010). If the relevance of international law 
comes through norm building and in other ‘soft’ ways, as asserted here, then the political 
and legal advances made to govern fluid transboundary resources across static territorial 
borders may yet be reversed. A second, related, threat is to the robustness of the body of 
IWL, which has been found to be challenged by potential incompatibility between the 
various instruments, notably the sovereignty clause introduced by the Draft Aquifer 
Articles. The analysis has exposed how this incompatibility may reduce the effectiveness 
(or reputation of effectiveness) of IWL – and thus perpetuate ideas about its non- 
relevance. 
Analysis of empirical findings and literature indicates that these threats are tied to a 
third, even greater threat: the apparent shift of IWL away from the guiding doctrine of 
limited territorial sovereignty and towards absolute territorial sovereignty. In the sense that 
the shift indicates a greater engagement with IWL by states that have otherwise denigrated 
it or use it instrumentally (Turkey and Israel, in the cases considered here), it counters the 
first of the threats mentioned above. Indeed, the evolution towards absolute territorial 
sovereignty makes IWL not simply relevant to upstream states; it may actually mean that 
IWL favours them. This is because they already enjoy political sovereignty over the 
territory where a transboundary watercourse arises or recharges – and may now extend 
that territorial sovereignty, with some argument, to the water that flows through the 
aquifer. 
This type of relevance merits scrutiny for its potential long-term effects. With an 
appreciation that relative power asymmetry is more determining of control over a trans- 
boundary resource than is riparian position (Zeitoun & Warner, 2006), the assertion that 
the introduction of the sovereignty clause may favour upstream states more accurately 
holds for the more powerful states, whether up-, mid-, or downstream. This is because of 
the way that states may use the various forms of power at their disposal to employ 
international law in general to meet their unilateral interests, usually with impunity 
(Hathaway, 2005; Koh, 1997). Whether these more powerful states choose to achieve 
multilateral interests (and thereby conform e.g. to IWL) is related to the extent that the 
reinforcement of international norms also meets their unilateral interests – and these are 
typically shaped by political and economic forces. Thus, even with the drift towards 
absolute territorial sovereignty, IWL may serve for coordinated development where 
relations between the states are good. 
In the worst of cases, IWL risks serving uncoordinated development of transboundary 
watercourses, in the same way that the political economy does (see e.g. Conca, 2006; 
Earle, Jägerskog, & Öjendal, 2010). In this sense, recommendations to harmonize the 
legal instruments appear the best legal route forward (McCaffrey, 2011; McIntyre, 2011). 
The non-legal water community has a role to play here, too, however – at least in support 
of the norm-building processes that re-affirm the doctrine of limited territorial sovereignty 
and which ensure that the principles of IWL are pursued in practice, even if they are not in 
theory. 
The research has exposed more questions that should be answered. It would be 
beneficial to understand, for instance, the conditions under which some upstream states 
invoke equitable and reasonable use (Lebanon and Ethiopia, in our cases) and some do 
not (Turkey or Sudan – see Salman, 2014). Further research is also required to move 
beyond  the  limits  imposed  by  the  specifics  of  this  article.  Testing  the       methods 
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developed here on hydropolitical constellations with entirely different sets of relations 
and patterns of river flow or aquifer recharge would be one step in this direction; more 
evidence of the influence of politics over the creation and application of IWL would be 
another. 
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Notes 
1. Subject to ratifications of the amendment, including by  Ukraine. 
2. These other bodies of law are not discussed further here, due to limited space. Note the cross- 
instrument work by Leb (2012), Tignino (2011a, 2011a), and Miroso & Harris  (2012). 
3. The evolution of IWL has been well covered in many texts, including Salman (2007), Rieu- 
Clarke et al. (2012), Leb (2013), and Gander (2014). It is therefore covered only selectively 
here. 
4. The remaining two doctrines are variants of the two discussed. The doctrine of absolute 
territorial integrity “imposes a duty on [upstream] state[s] not to restrict such natural flow of 
waters to other lower riparians” (Salman, 2007, p. 627). At a superficial level, absolute 
territorial integrity seems clearly in the interests of downstream states, and has been largely 
discredited for the impact it can have on upstream states (i.e. preventing or compromising any 
development of the river by the upstream state). Like limited territorial sovereignty, the 
doctrine of ‘community of interests’ rises above the notion of sovereignty by considering  
how the flow of water renders it more compatible with being viewed as common property and 
in the common interests of the states the water runs through (McCaffrey, 2007). The selection 
of principles reviewed here is based on the author’s judgement of those most relevant to the 
specific focus of the article. 
5. The main actors in the development of international water law include two scholarly NGOs, 
the Institute of International Law (IIL) and the International Law Association (ILA); and two 
UN bodies, the International Law Commission (ILC) and the UN Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE). 
6. Conceptual work on the coordinated implementation of the two conventions is underway (see 
e.g. Kinna, Rieu-Clarke, and Rocha Loures, 2013; UNECE,  2013). 
7. At its autumn 2013 session, the General Assembly decided to delay the vote a second time, by 
including the item in the agenda of its 71st (2016)  session. 
8. This recognition is evident first and foremost in World Bank  practice. 
9. The court recognized there the right of an injured state to take “certain measures, including 
countermeasures”, in the case of “violation of . . . treaty rules or of rules of general interna- 
tional law”. 
10. The selection of rules checked is limited to those considered by the author to be of the most 
relevance to the purpose of the article. The compatibility of a greater number of rules is 
checked in Afial (2014). The compatibility of the UNWC and the UNECE Water Convention 
has been confirmed by McCaffrey (2014) and Rieu-Clarke and Kinna (2014), who recommend 
that states accede to and employ both  instruments. 
11. A related principle details obligations relevant to the prevention and control of transboundary 
water pollution. The obligation to “prevent, reduce, and control” pollution is strongly asserted 
in much the same wording in the UNWC (Art. 21), the Draft Aquifer Articles (Art. 11) and the 
UNECE Water Convention (Art. 2.2). 
12. Sudan sponsored the UNWC in 1997; both Ethiopia and Egypt abstained. Ethiopia, Sudan and 
Egypt have not commented on the Draft Aquifer  Articles. 
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13. With Palestine’s ratification of the UNWC in January 2015 (to enter into force 2 April 2015), 
both upstream entities on the Jordan River (as well as Jordan and Syria) have ratified the 
UNWC. 
14. “Israel welcomes the emphasis the draft articles give to the issue of sovereignty over 
transboundary aquifers” (UN ILC, 2008, comment 92). The position is then qualified: 
“However, Israel does not support the making of  exceptions  to accepted international  law  
on this issue. Therefore, Israel suggests adding the words ‘international law and’ after the word 
‘with’ to draft article 3.” 
15. Turkey is downstream of Lebanon and upstream of Greece on other rivers. The general 
policy of the government of Turkey on IWL cannot be gauged from examination of the  
Tigris and Euphrates alone (Çonker, 2014). Likewise, to  understand  Iran’s  position  on 
water law and transboundary water policy one must consider its many other transbound-   
ary rivers and aquifers, particularly when it is downstream  (Hanasz,  2012;  Nageeby,  
2014). 
16. “An explicit reference to the sovereignty of States over the natural resources within their 
territories is preferred. This reference is particularly important in case that dialogue or 
cooperation among the riparian States of the transboundary aquifer is not at the level which 
enables joint equitable and reasonable utilization” (UN ILC, 2008, comment 94 [Turkey]). The 
comment then suggests wording that makes the importance of “sovereignty” even more 
explicit than in the final version. 
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